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One Hundred Years of Equality: Saving
California's Statutory Ban on Arbitrary
Discrimination by Businesses
By SANDE L. Burm*
M OST UNITED STATES LAWS prohibiting discrimination by busi-
nesses focus on specific types of discrimination, including race, relig-
ion, ancestry, national origin, gender, age, or disability.' Businesses
may exclude customers for any reason so long as they do not do so for
a statutorily prohibited reason. For over 100 years, California has
taken a significant step further, prohibiting all forms of arbitrary busi-
ness discrimination. 2 Initially, the statutory ban applied only to public
accommodations; however, since the enactment of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act 3 ("Unruh Act" or the "Act") amendments in 1959, the stat-
utory ban has applied to "all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever."4 Until recently, California businesses could not exclude
someone on the basis of a simple excuse such as, "I don't like you" or
"I don't like your kind." As a result, California businesses could not
discriminate against hippies because they were hippies,5 police of-
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1. See Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (providing recourse to those discrimi-
nated on the basis of their disability); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1994) (providing recourse to those discriminated against on the basis of their
age); New York Public Accommodations Act, N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAw § 40 (Consol. 2001)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "creed, color, or national origin").
2. See 1897 Cal. Stat., ch. 108, § 1, p. 137; see also 1919 Cal. Stat. ch. 210, § 1, p. 309;
1923 Cal. Stat., ch. 235, § 1, p. 485.
3. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 51 (West 2001).
4. Id. This article will not discuss the issue of what constitutes a business establish-
ment under the Act. That issue has been previously addressed. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am,, 952 P.2d 218 (1998).
5. See In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 999 (Cal. 1970) (holding that a business may not
arbitrarily exclude a would be customer from its premises).
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ficers because they were police officers, 6 gays because they were gay, 7
or Republicans because they were Republican.
Over the past ten years, however, several lower courts in Califor-
nia have radically reduced these broad statutory protections. These
lower courts have held that the Unruh Act only prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of characteristics specifically enumerated in the
Act-sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability.8
If followed, this line of cases threatens to convert the Unruh Act into a
pale imitation of federal law, overturning a century of anti-discrimina-
tion jurisprudence. 9 Some might view these cases, not yet ratified by
the California Supreme Court, as evidence of extreme judicial activ-
ism. Alternatively, the recent trend in the case law may be explained,
at least in part, by the lack of a set of well-articulated standards for
adjudicating discrimination claims not framed in terms of suspect
classes.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of California's ban on
arbitrary discrimination by businesses, from the 1897 Equal Rights
Statute1° to its most recent legislative amendments to the Unruh Act.
This history establishes that the California legislature intended, and
until recently the courts had uniformly construed, the ban to prohibit
all forms of arbitrary discrimination. Part II examines the recent cases
that purport to radically limit that ban, and focuses in particular on
the difficulties that may have led recent lower courts to seemingly ex-
treme interpretations of the Act. Finally, Part III attempts to resolve
these difficulties by proposing an approach, consistent with the 100-
year history of the ban, that would permit courts to continue to re-
spect the often-stated will of the legislature.
Regardless of whether courts adopt the approach set forth
herein, courts should find a way to construe the Unruh Act to protect
the rights of all persons to participate in a society free from arbitrary
discrimination. This protection is necessary not just on the basis of
6. See Long v. Valentino, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990)
(discriminating on the basis of occupation was covered; ACLU could violate the Act by
forcibly requesting police officer to leave conference on police espionage).
7. See Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984) (holding that a restaurant's pol-
icy of seating only two people of opposite sex in semi-private booths is illegal); Hubert v.
Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (1982) (holding that homosexuals and those who associ-
ate with homosexuals are protected from arbitrary discrimination).
8. See Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 597 (1992); Roth v. Rhodes, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d 706 (1994); Liebaert v. Biltmore Props., No. 238402 (Kern Co. Super. Ct.
1999).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
10. 1897 Cal. Stat., ch. 108, § 1, p. 137.
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immutable characteristics such as race or national origin, but on all
aspects of personal choice, such as religion, marital status, personal
appearance, and occupation. Certainly businesses and places of public
accommodation may need some legitimate business exceptions to this
general policy; however, those exceptions must be narrow and based
on sound, rational judgments, not on arbitrary characteristics.
I. Historic Interpretation of the Statutory Ban
A. Basic Rule
At common law, enterprises engaged in "public" or "common"
callings or "affected with a public interest" I t were prohibited from en-
gaging in discriminatory conduct.12 Common law imposed upon these
enterprises "the duty to serve all customers on reasonable terms with-
out discrimination and the duty to provide the kind of product or
service reasonably to be expected from their economic role."' 3 In
1897, the California legislature codified these common law doc-
trines, 14 stating:
[A] II citizens within the jurisdiction of this civil state shall be enti-
tled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating-houses, barber
shops, bath-houses, theaters, skating rinks, and all other places of
public accommodation or amusement, subject only to the condi-
tions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all
citizens. 1
11. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26, 37-42 (1883) (Harlan, J,. dissenting); In re
Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 996 (Cal. 1970). See Klim v.Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 118-20 (N.D. Cal.
1970). See Norman F. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV.
411, 418-28 (1927); see also Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J.
1089, 1098-99 (1930); Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the
Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1249 (1967).
12. SeeTobriner & Grodin, supra note 11, at 1250 ("[S]uch occupations as blacksmith,
food seller, veterinarian, and tailor, as well as those of common carrier and innkeeper,
were probably included in that category.") (footnotes omitted).
13. Id. SeeJ. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, § 508, at 483 (9th ed.
1878); cf Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286, 296-304 (1964) (Goldberg, J,. concurring);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1962) (Douglas, J,. concurring); Greenberg
v. W. Turf Ass'n., 82 P. 684, 685 (Cal. 1905); Willis v. McMahan, 26 P. 649 (Cal. 1891);
Turner v. North Beach & Mission R.R., 34 Cal. 594, 600 (1868); Pleasants v. North Beach &
Mission R.R., 34 Cal. 586, 589 (1868).
14. See Ronald P. Klein, The California Equal Rights Statutes in Practice, 10 STAN. L. REV.
253, 257-58 (1958) ("These statutes ... have been thought merely to provide the means
for preservation of existing common law rights . ).
15. 1897 Cal. Stat., ch. 108, § 1, p. 137.
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In 1919, the 1897 Act was broadened to include public conveyances, 16
and in 1923, the Act was further broadened to include "places where
ice cream or soft drinks of any kind are sold for consumption on the
premises ....,17
The 1897 Act and its amendments were construed to require
"public service businesses and the duty of innkeepers and common
carriers to furnish accommodations to all persons in the absence of
some reasonable ground for discrimination."1 8 The ban was premised
on the principle that "[u] nder our institutions the freedom to pursue
the declared right [to public accommodations] on an equal basis is
just as precious as many other freedoms and rights."' 9 In applying the
ban, therefore, courts construed it as protecting against all forms of
arbitrary discrimination. In 1951, in Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club,"0
the California Supreme Court held that the 1897 Act barred the man-
ager of a racetrack from expelling a patron who had acquired a repu-
tation as a man of immoral character.2 1 The court reasoned that "the
private business, the personal relations with others, [and] the past
conduct [of the patron] not on the premises,... whether or not rele-
vant to indicate his character, are immaterial in the application of the
statutory standards .... "22 The court acknowledged that the proprie-
tor might be justified in limiting a patron's access to a public establish-
ment if public safety and welfare were threatened by the patron's
acts. 23 In Orloff however, there was no evidence that the patron posed
any threat to the safety and welfare of the public.24 The court there-
fore held that the manager of the racetrack acted unlawfully in ex-
cluding the plaintiff.25 Later that same year, in Stoumen v. Reilly,26 the
court held that the 1897 Act prohibited businesses from discriminat-
ing against gay persons. The court found that
Members of the public of lawful age have a right to patronize a
public restaurant and bar so long as they are acting properly and
are not committing illegal or immoral acts; the proprietor has no
16. See 1919 Cal. Stat., ch. 210, § 1, p. 309.
17. 1923 Cal. Stat., ch. 235, § 1, p. 485.
18. Klein, supra note 14, at 258.
19. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 227 P.2d 449, 453 (Cal. 1951).
20. 227 P.2d 449, 453 (1951).
21. See id. at 449.
22. It at 454.
23. See id. at 453-54.
24. See id. at 454.
25. See id.
26. 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
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right to exclude or eject a patron "except for good cause," and if
he does so without good cause he is liable in damages. 27
In the late 1950's, the legislature became concerned that the courts
were too narrowly defining the types of businesses to which the 1897
Act applied. 28
In 1959, the legislature amended the Unruh Civil Rights Act,29
providing in part that "[a] 11 persons . . . are free and equal, and no
matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations ... in all business es-
tablishments of every kind whatsoever." 30 The purpose of the Unruh
Act was to expand, not restrict, the scope of the 1897 Equal Rights
Statute-specifically, to make clear that the statutory ban on arbitrary
discrimination applied to all businesses, not just to those enumerated
in the Act.3' As the California Supreme Court promptly acknowl-
edged, the Unruh Act's enumeration of specific types of discrimina-
tion was intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.32 Prior to the
amendment, courts never limited the 1897 Act's protections to dis-
crimination based on "color, race, religion, ancestry, and national ori-
gin. ... "33 There was no evidence that the Unruh Act was intended to
deprive citizens of protection from arbitrary discrimination-indeed,
all evidence was to the contrary. 34
Accordingly, in 1970, in In re Cox,35 the court ruled that the 1897
Act as amended by the Unruh Act (collectively the "Acts"), prohibited
discrimination on the basis of a person's appearance. In Cox, the
plaintiff alleged that he had been unlawfully excluded from a shop-
ping center because his male companion had long hair and was un-
conventionally dressed, in short, because his friend was a "hippie. ' '36
The court concluded that both the history and language of the Unruh
Act indicated the legislature's intent to prohibit all forms of arbitrary
27. Id. at 971. The court also recognized the right of prostitutes to dine and drink in a
bar or restaurant. See id. (citing In re Farley, 217 N.Y. 105 (1916)).
28. See In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 997 (1970).
29. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 2001).
30. Id. at § 51.1.
31. See Cox, 474 P.2d at 995; see also Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217, 218 (1984).
32. See Cox, 474 P.2d at 995; see also Rolon, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
33. Cox, 474 P.2d at 995.
34. See id. ("[B]oth its history and its language disclose a clear and large design to
interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise."); see also id. at 999 ("[Tlhe
Civil Rights Act forbids a business establishment . from arbitrarily excluding a prospec-
tive customer.").
35. 474 P.2d 992 (1970).
36. See id. at 1000.
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discrimination by business establishments, regardless of the basis, 7
The court held that discrimination against the plaintiff because of his
companion's appearance violated the Acts. 38 "The shopping center
may no more exclude individuals who wear long hair or unconven-
tional dress, [than those] who are black, who are members of the
John Birch Society, or who belong to the American Civil Liberties
Union, merely because of these characteristics or associations."39
In 1974, the California legislature again amended the Acts by ad-
ding "sex" to the categories of specifically enumerated bases of pro-
hibited discrimination, while leaving all other portions of the statute
intact.40 In making this modification, the legislature again noted that
the amendment was not intended to limit the scope of the statute's
protection to the specifically enumerated classes, but was merely in-
tended to be illustrative. 41 The legislature was explicit in this regard:
The purpose of the bill is to bring to the attention of the legal
profession that the Unruh Act provides a remedy for arbitrary dis-
crimination against women (or men) in public accommodations
which are business enterprises. This bill does not bring such dis-
crimination under the Unruh Act because the Act has been inter-
preted as making all arbitrary discrimination illegal, on whatever
basis. The listing of possible bases of discrimination has no legal
effect, but is merely illustrative. 42
In so acting, the legislature ratified the prior consistent judicial view
that the Acts proscribed 'all forms of arbitrary discrimination, not
merely those specifically enumerated in the Acts. 43
Consistent with this view, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, both
the California courts and the California Attorney General interpreted
the Acts as continuing to prohibit all forms of arbitrary discrimination
by covered businesses. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion,44 age, 45 marital status, 46 or occupation, 47 and discrimination
37. See id. at 995, 998.
38. See id. at 995-96.
39. Id. at 1000.
40. See 1974 Cal. Stat., ch. 1193, § 1, p. 194. See also Harris v. Capital Growth, 805 P.2d
873, 877 (Cal. 1991).
41. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 122 (Cal. 1982).
42. Id. at 122-23.
43. See id.
44. See Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984) (finding that a restaurant's policy
to only seat two people of the opposite sex in semiprivate booths to be illegal discrimination
under the Unruh Act); Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (1982) (holding that
homosexuals, as well as those who associate with homosexuals, are protected from arbitrary
discrimination under the Unruh Act).
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against students,48 welfare recipients,49 persons who associated with
blacks, 50 and families with children 51 were all held to be unlawful
under the Acts even though Unruh Act amendments did not enumer-
ate these classifications. The Act prohibited covered California busi-
nesses from discriminating on any arbitrary basis.52
B. Legitimate Business Exception
The law was equally clear that only arbitrary discrimination was pro-
hibited. Businesses frequently make distinctions, for example, be-
tween customers who can afford to pay and those who cannot, and
between customers whose use is consistent with the service provided
and those whose use is not. The courts acknowledged that businesses
might limit access to their services on grounds "rationally related to
the services performed and facilities provided. ''53 This "legitimate bus-
iness exception," in effect, permits business owners to run their busi-
nesses in a business-like manner. The "particular business interests of
the purveyor in maintaining order, complying with legal require-
ments, and protecting a business reputation or investment" justify pol-
icies that make "distinctions among its customers." 54 The legitimate
45. See O'Connor v. Vill. Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) (condemning
an age restriction in the covenants, conditions, and restrictions of a condominium develop-
ment refusing residency to persons under the age of 18 as violative of the Unruh Act).
46. See 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 608, 613 (1975).
47. See Long v. Valentino, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1989), reh'g denied, 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS
202 (4th App. Dist. Jan. 19, 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 855 (1990)) (finding that discrimi-
nation on the basis of occupation was covered by the Act, the court found that the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union could be held in violation of the Act by forcibly requesting a
police officer to leave a conference on police espionage).
48. See 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 70, 71 (1976) ("[A] rbitrary discrimination based on...
student status is ... prohibited by the Act.").
49. See 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 223, 225 (1976) ("We conclude that a blanket termina-
tion of tenancy and refusal to rent housing merely because the tenant/applicant is eligible
for and receiving public assistance benefits would not be permitted under the Act.").
50. See Winchell v. English, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1976) (finding the business practice of
discriminating against persons on account of their associations with individuals of the
black race to be arbitrary discrimination, which is prohibited under the Act).
51. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 116 (Cal. 1982) (holding that a
rental policy refusing to rent housing to families with children to be illegal discrimination
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
52. As stated above, the issue of what qualifies as a business under the Unruh Act is
not within the scope of this article.
53. In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 995-96 (Cal. 1970) (noting that the statute's proscription
against discrimination on the basis of arbitrary classifications is not absolute, whereby es-
tablishments may implement discriminatory policies so long as those regulations are rea-
sonable and rationally related to a legitimate business interest).
54. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 884 (Cal. 1991).
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business exception, however, does not apply to classes that are specifi-
cally enumerated in the Unruh Act.55
1. Non-Specifically Enumerated Classes
The court in Wynn v. Monterey Club56 held that the exclusion by a
gambling establishment of a pathological gambler who had written
bad checks was "good business and social practice" that did not violate
the Unruh Act.5 7 Since the exclusion was not based on any of the
specified categories within the Act, the court's inquiry turned on
whether the alleged discrimination was arbitrary.58 In contrast to Or-
loff the court in Wynn found that the denial of access to the establish-
ment was not arbitrary.59 In Orloff the plaintiff was expelled from an
establishment simply because of his reputation of immoral charac-
ter.60 Conversely, in Wynn, plaintiffs had written bad checks totaling
$1,750 and had accumulated gambling debts of up to $30,000 causing
the defendant to exclude plaintiffs in order to avoid additional future
monetary losses.61 Thus, the exclusion was not arbitrary because plain-
tiff's poor credit history with defendant's establishment directly
threatened defendant's business practice of securing payment.
Similarly in Frantz v. Blackwell,62 the court held that refusal to sell
to a potential competitor did not violate the Unruh Act. Blackwell, a
single family home developer, refused to sell real estate property to
plaintiff, a real estate agent, because the plaintiff allegedly
"purchase[d] units in new developments, delay[ed] escrow closing,
and attempt[ed] to resell the units before his escrow close[d], using
the time delay and Blackwell's promotional efforts . . . to create a
profit. '63 To require the defendant to sell to plaintiff would adversely
affect defendant's business because the plaintiff would become a sales
competitor instead of a buyer-occupant. Furthermore, defendant's re-
fusal to sell to plaintiff was not arbitrary discrimination against a
group of people nor was it status-based 64 Instead, the plaintiffs con-
duct, as opposed to his status, caused the defendant to reasonably re-
55. See Wynn v. Monterey Club, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1980).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 882.
58. See id. at 881.
59. See id.
60. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 227 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1951).
61. Wynn, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
62. 234 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1987).
63. Id. at 179.
64. See id. at 181.
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fuse to sell to an investor-speculator taking advantage of the
defendant's skills as a developer. 65
Additionally in Ross v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park,66 the court up-
held the exclusion of uninvited "punk rockers" from a private funeral.
Here, plaintiff had an agreement with the defendant park owner to
keep the funeral services quiet and private. 67 The defendant failed to
do so, allowing a group of "punk rockers" to attend the services. 68 The
"punk rockers" disturbed the services to the point that police had to
be called. 69 The defendant business argued that cases such as Marina
Point, Ltd. and In re Cox supported their argument that they could not
deny the "punk rockers" access to the services. 70 The court found that
these cases did not apply, because the "punk rockers" were not poten-
tial customers and were being disruptive. 71 Since the defendant was in
the business of providing services by bringing comfort to families, the
court found that the denial of access was "rationally related to the
services performed. '72 The defendant was held responsible for al-
lowing the "punk rockers" to disturb the funeral. 73
Finally, in Reilly v. Stroh, 74 the court held that a proprietor was not
required to allow underage patrons on premises that sold alcoholic
beverages. 75 The plaintiff, a restaurant owner, had a "'bona fide pub-
lic eating place' on-sale beer and wine license" which was suspended
as a result of serving alcohol to minors.76 The plaintiff claimed that he
had done all that could be done to try to prevent the underage cus-
tomers from drinking, but that he could not go as far as to prohibit
entry.77 Plaintiff cited the Unruh Act and prior decisions prohibiting
arbitrary discrimination. 78 The court found that denying access to per-
sons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one was not arbitrary
discrimination because the California Constitution provides that bar
owners may do so in order to prevent underage drinking.79
65. See id.
66. 203 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1984).
67. See id. at 470.
68. See id. at 471.
69. See id. at 470-71.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 473.
72. Id. at 471 (quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (1982)).
73. See id. at 472.
74. 207 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1984).
75. See id. at 251.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 251.
78. See id. at 252.
79. See id. at 253.
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The Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination, not discrimination
based upon legitimate business practices. As evidenced by the cases
above, to use the legitimate business practice exception the defendant
must prove that the exclusion of an individual or group of people is
"rationally related to the services performed." 80
2. Specifically Protected Classes
The legitimate business exception is not available, however, to
justify discrimination on any of the bases specifically enumerated in
the Unruh Act-race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disabil-
ity, or sex. Thus, in Koire v. Metro Car Wash,81 no legitimate business
exception was found for offering discounts and free admission to wo-
men only.82 The court stated: "Although the list of classes enumerated
in the Act has been held to be illustrative rather than exhaustive...
the inclusion of 'sex' in the list clearly covers discrimination based on
sex."83 The court so held notwithstanding undisputed evidence that
the discounts were profitable to defendant's business. In the case of
specifically protected classes, the court ruled that discriminatory prac-
tices are not lawful simply because they are profitable or otherwise in
the interest of the business.84
Similarly, in Engel v. Worthington,8 5 the court rejected a photogra-
pher's justification for refusing to publish a picture of a male high
school alumnus with his male guest in a high school reunion picture
book.8 6 The defendant asserted that "pictures of men and women sold
better than same-gender pictures and [the] goal was to make as many
pictures as possible that would sell."87 Defendant acknowledged that if
the alumnus had been female, or if his guest had been female, the
photograph would have been published, 88 and therefore, the defen-
dant's "services were gender dependent."8 9 As in Koire, the court held
80. See supra note 72.
81. Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985).
82. Id. at 200.
83. Id. at 196 ("[T]he Act applies to classifications based on sex.").
84. See id. at 199.
85. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (1993). Review to the California Supreme Court denied on
Feb. 3, 1994. Engel v. Worthington, No. G012734, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 558, 558, 94 Cal. Daily
Op. Service 881 (1994). In denying review, the California Supreme Court ordered that the
opinion be not officially published. CAL. R. COURT 976, 977, 979 (the Court of Appeal
decision was previously published at 19 Cal. App. 4th 43).
86. See Engel v. Worthington, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1993).
87. Id. at 333.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 331.
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that the discriminatory practice was unlawful under the Unruh Act
notwithstanding the defendant's purported economic justifications. 90
Holding the photographer's business reasons as insufficient to justify
the refusal to extend services to same-sex companions, the court rea-
soned that "[i]f a business owner could avoid the Act's mandates sim-
ply by relying on economic defenses, exceptions would eviscerate the
rule."91
Courts have also held that discrimination contrary to public pol-
icy is arbitrary, and therefore is not protected under the Unruh Act.
For instance, in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson,92 a landlord refused to
renew a lease in an apartment complex advertised as adult-only to a
couple after they had given birth. 93 The landlord attempted to justify
its restrictive policy as an effort to maintain a "quiet and peaceful resi-
dential atmosphere by excluding all minors from its housing accom-
modations, thus providing its adult tenants with a 'child free'
environment. ' 94 The California Supreme Court held that the land-
lord's discrimination was arbitrary, and therefore unlawful, 95 refusing
to apply the legitimate business exception in such circumstances.
96
The court held that there was a paramount social interest in making
housing available to families with children.97 In O'Connor v. Village
Green Owners Association,98 the court similarly condemned condomin-
ium covenants that prohibited the residency of any person under the
age of eighteen as violative of the Unruh Act.99 The court rejected, as
90. See id. at 334.
91. Id.
92. 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982).
93. See id. at 117-18.
94. Id. at 117.
95. See id. ("The fact that the landlord's exclusionary policy in this case discriminated
against children and families with children, rather than a specific racial or religious group
or some other classification specifically involved in a prior judicial decision, does not place
the exclusionary practice beyond the reach of the Unruh Act.").
96. See id. at 124-26.
97. See id. at 128. The court noted that in 1979, the Legislature stated:
The Legislature finds and declares that the state's housing problems are substan-
tial, complex and now of crisis proportions .... The Legislature finds and de-
clares that the greatest need for housing is experienced by residents at the lower
end of the economic scale. Many moderate and low income households with chil-
dren cannot normally find decent, safe and suitable housing at prices they can
afford ....
Id. at 128-29 (citing 1979 Cal. Stat., ch. 1043, §§ 1, 2, pp. 3643-44). Therefore, the court
concluded, the landlord's business practice exacerbates the current housing problem, and
thus runs counter to public policy. See id.
98. 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983).
99. See id. at 428.
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contrary to public policy, arguments that children were disruptive and
that their exclusion was therefore a legitimate business practice. 00
The legislature subsequently codified Marina Point, Ltd. and
O'Connor, adding California Civil Code section 51.2 which explicitly
prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of age. 10' The legisla-
ture once again ratified the court's long standing interpretation that
the Acts prohibit all arbitrary discrimination, not merely specifically
enumerated forms. In recognition of the special needs of senior citi-
zens, it also adopted California Civil Code section 51.3, allowing an
exception for senior citizen housing. 102
II. Recent Judicial Difficulties
A. The California Supreme Court-Harris v. Capital Growth
Investors XIV
For nearly twenty years prior to 1986, the California Supreme
Court consistently interpreted the Unruh Act to by and large prohibit
all arbitrary discrimination. Most notably, in 1970 Justice Tobriner
wrote the Cox opinion expressing the unanimous view of the court
that the Unruh Act prohibited all arbitrary discrimination, including
discrimination on the basis of a person's appearance. 10 3 This opinion
laid the foundation for establishing that all forms of arbitrary discrimi-
nation by businesses, irrespective of their bases, are unlawful. 10 4 In the
100. See id. at 431.
101. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.2 (West Supp. 2001). This section entitled Age discrimina-
tion in housing prohibited; exception; intent, provides:
(a) Section 51 shall be construed to prohibit a business establishment from dis-
criminating in the sale or rental of housing based upon age. Where accommoda-
tions are designed to meet the physical and social needs of senior citizens, a
business establishment may establish and preserve that housing for senior citi-
zens, pursuant to [s]ection 51.3 ....
(b) This section is intended to clarify the holdings in [Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolf-
son, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982), and O'Connor v. Viii. Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d
427 (1983)].
Id.
102. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 51.3 (West Supp. 2001). This section entitled Housing; age
limitations; necessity for senior citizen housing states:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that this section is essential to establish
and preserve specially designed accessible housing for senior citizens. There are
senior citizens who need special living environments and services, and find that
there is an inadequate supply of this type of housing in the state.
Id.
103. See In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 999-1000 (Cal. 1970).
104. See id. at 995.
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decade following Harris, the California courts continually followed the
Tobriner view advanced in Cox. 0 5
However, the California Supreme Court's approach drastically
changed in 1986. The 1986judicial retention election deposed three
justices from the California Supreme Court: Chief Justice Bird and
Justices Grodin and Reynoso. 10 6 This transition marked the end of the
short-lived Bird Court. The aftermath of the 1986 election resulted in
the appointment of more conservative justices and the promotion of
Malcolm Lucas to Chief Justice. 10 7 The Lucas court "maintained the
appearance of continuity in the law and respect for precedent while,
nevertheless, significantly changing the results in individual cases."108
In particular, the California Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Harris
v. Capital Growth Investors X/V 109 meaningfully altered the interpreta-
tion of the Unruh Act, though the court was careful not to tread upon
the precedent of Cox.110 The Lucas opinion in Harris limited the scope
of the Unruh Act and challenged the historically recognized blanket
prohibition against all arbitrary discrimination.
In Harris, the defendants, who owned and operated apartment
buildings, required that applicants demonstrate sufficient income to
be considered as potential renters-a fairly standard business practice
among landlords."1 For this purpose, defendants defined sufficient
income as monthly income equal to or greater than three times the
rent charged. 112 The plaintiffs, whose income consisted solely of pub-
lic assistance benefits, claimed that the defendants' policy was arbi-
105. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982); O'Connor v. Vill.
Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983); Rolon v Kulwitzky, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal.
1984); Long v. Valentino, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1989); Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App. 3d
125 (1976).
106. See Kevin M. Mulcahy, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most Progressive
State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 863, 891 (2000)
(discussing the 1986 retention election campaign as focused on the liberal decisions of the
Bird court.). See generally Stephen R. Barnett, California Justice, 78 CAL. L. REV. 247 (1990)
(observing that the focus of the opposition was primarily on Chief Justice Bird because of
her dissents from opinions affirming death penalties. Justices Reynoso and Grodin were
bystanders at the beginning, but they remained vulnerable as attention spread from the
ChiefJustice to the court. The state Republican party position itself opposed the retention
of the Chief Justice, and Justices Reynoso and Grodin as well, because they were conve-
nient targets for officeholders seeking a political advantage.).
107. See Mulcahy, supra note 106, at 892-93.
108. J. Clark Kelso, A Tribute to Retiring ChiefJustice Malcolm M. Lucas, 27 PAC. L.J. 1401,
1401 (1996).
109. 805 P.2d 873 (1991).
110. See id. at 874.
111. See id. at 885.
112. See id.
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trary discrimination on the basis of income and was prohibited under
the Unruh Act.113 Plaintiffs argued that the assumption that persons
who met the specified income standard would be more likely to pay
rent than those who did not was unsubstantiated and did not reflect
the actual ability to pay.' 14 Plaintiffs also maintained that use of a min-
imum income policy was arbitrary because it declined to treat them as
individuals and "stereotype [d]" them as being low income and unable
to pay rent.115 Relying on the prior decision in Cox, plaintiffs argued
that the Unruh Act banned all forms of arbitrary discrimination, in-
cluding the alleged discrimination at bar.
Rather than relying on the legitimate business exception to up-
hold their policy, defendants argued that the Unruh Act simply did
not apply." 6 Defendants' contended that the Unruh Act did not apply
to economic selection criteria such as the minimum income policy
because they fell outside the Unruh Act's specified classifications of
race, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, age, or disability.1 17
Focusing on the language of the Act and the repeated references to
enumerated classes, defendants requested that the court either con-
fine the scope of the Act's protections to the enumerated classes, or at
least exclude from its coverage economic and financial criteria such as
its minimum income requirement rental policy." 8 Defendants
pointed to the language of the Act that gave special emphasis to the
list of categories of prohibited discrimination by repeating the list
three times-twice in section 51 and again in section 52, where it pro-
vided a remedy only for discrimination "on account of color, race,
religion, ancestry, or national origin."'" 9 This construction seemingly
prohibited only specific types of discrimination based on the enumer-
ated categories, rather than a complete ban on all forms of arbitrary
discrimination. Thus, defendants argued, the Unruh Act was inappli-
cable to defendants' alleged economic discrimination because such
discrimination was not of the type falling within the enumerated cate-
gories of discrimination prohibited by the Act.
The new conservative court was reluctant to overrule the prior
California Supreme Court opinions despite the majority's reservation
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 886.
116. See id. at 878.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
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with past interpretations of the Unruh Act. 120 The court was unwilling
to infer legislative intent based on defendant's interpretation of the
descriptive language of the statute. Although it viewed defendant's ar-
gument as meritorious, the court examined both the actions taken by
the legislature in response to Cox, and the related appellate court de-
cisions)2 1 The court presumed that the legislature was aware of those
prior decisions and acknowledged that the legislature did not take
specific action to overrule them.12 2 Moreover, the legislature
amended the Unruh Act several times in the twenty-year period since
Cox was decided without altering portions of the provision that various
appellate courts had previously construed. 123 Thus, the court rejected
defendant's suggestion that the Unruh Act applies only to statutorily
enumerated categories of discrimination.
Instead of rejecting Cox and its progeny to hold in favor of de-
fendants, the court introduced an alternative interpretation of the
Unruh Act to hold in favor of defendants while cautiously leaving pre-
cedent intact. The court in Harris devised a new interpretation of the
Act by returning to the prohibited categories of discrimination in the
statute. In essence, the court found that the specified categories share
a common element involving personal characteristics. 124 When prior
courts applied the Act to arbitrary discrimination beyond the specified
categories, "personal characteristics and not financial status or capa-
bility provided the basis of decision." 12 5 Because prior cases have in-
volved arbitrary discrimination based on personal characteristics in
some form or another, there is no case law supporting the notion that
economic distinctions are proscribed.1 26 Nonetheless, the court held
that defendants' minimum income policy was justified by the land-
lord's legitimate business interest in assessing the capability of pro-
spective tenants to pay rent on a continuing basis.' 27 The court
recognized that "[b]usiness establishments have an obvious and im-
portant interest in obtaining full and timely payment for the goods
and services they provide"128 and "citizens . . . shall pay the charges
120. See id. at 879 ("Although defendants' argument against Cox, Marina Point, Ltd.,
and related cases is not without foundation, it does not afford a sufficiently compelling
reason to overrule the holdings of Cox and its progeny.").
121. See id. at 879-80.
122. See id. at 879.
123. See id.
124. See id at 883.
125. Id.
126. See id at 883-84.
127. See id. at 889.
128. Id. at 884.
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imposed, equally and without discrimination."1 29 Thus, a landlord has
the legitimate business interest of securing rental payment and imple-
menting policies "designed to screen out prospective tenants who are
likely to default." 13°
Absent the court's respect for prior judicial decisions in cases
such as Cox, the court in Harris would have reached the same decision
to uphold the defendant's selection policy, but on different grounds.
The court in Harris stated:
As we have explained, were we writing on a clean slate, the re-
peated emphasis in the language of [the Act] ... on the specified
classifications of race, sex, religion, etc., would represent a highly
persuasive, if not dispositive, factor in our construction of the Act
.... Indeed, plaintiffs' argument in favor of an additional classifi-
cation of "economic discrimination" would effectively discard the
listed classifications as surplusage in violation of the mandate to
attribute significance to "every word and phrase" used by the
Legislature. 131
The court reasoned, however, that the categories expressly enumer-
ated in the Act "involve personal as opposed to economic characteris-
tics-a person's geographical origin, physical attributes, and personal
beliefs."' 32 Additionally the "Legislature's decision to enumerate per-
sonal characteristics, while conspicuously omitting financial or eco-
nomic ones, strongly suggests a limitation on the scope of Unruh
Act." 33 Therefore, had the court presided over unprecedented terri-
tory absent prior decisions such as Cox, the court would have con-
strued the Act as inapplicable to discrimination based on non-
personal factors such as financial or economic characteristics, thus re-
lieving the defendants from the Unruh Act at the onset.
In their dissents, Justices Mosk and Broussard argued that the
court disregarded stare decisis by ignoring Cox and its progeny's prohi-
bition of all forms of arbitrary discrimination.1 34 The dissent noted
that "until today courts of this state have understood ... that all arbi-
trary discrimination by a business establishment is prohibited by the
Unruh Act."1 35 Thus, the majority's distinction based on personal
characteristics was not supported by prior case law. 13 6 Referring to
129. Id. at 885.
130. Id. at 885.
131. Id. at 882 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 883.
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. See id. at 894-95.
135. Id. at 895.
136. See id. at 894-96.
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Cox, the dissent questioned whether any personal characteristics were
involved in discriminating "against [persons with] long hair and un-
conventional dress, or against friends of those with long hair and un-
conventional dress." 137 The dissent concluded, "[i]n spite of the fact
that the majority do not expressly overrule our holding in In re Cox[,]
... they still run afoul of the doctrine of stare decisis by limiting Cox to
its facts."1 38
Moreover, the dissent noted that the court's neglect in defining
"what, exactly, constitutes a personal characteristic" would hinder fu-
ture courts and practitioners in attempting to apply the Unruh Act.' 3 9
The examination of prior case law does little to clarify the Harris
court's "personal characteristic" distinction. Where prior courts have
invalidated discriminatory policies on the basis of one's appear-
ance,140 association with others,141 sexual orientation, 142 age,143 occu-
pation,1 44 and families with children,1 45 the Harris court would
presumably assert that those classifications are based on "personal
characteristics." Even in cases where discriminatory policies have been
upheld under the legitimate business exception, courts have not held
that the Unruh Act did not apply. Accordingly, the Act's protections
have not been denied to "punk rockers,"'146 realtors,1 47 and gam-
blers;' 48 and thus, again according to the Harris court, these persons
have been classified by their "personal characteristics."' 49 Such cov-
ered classifications, however, do not provide a clear picture of what
would constitute a "personal characteristic" and what would not. Con-
sequently, the Harris court left the definition of "personal characteris-
tic" ambiguous. This uncertainty shifted the determination of
coverage under the Unruh Act to whether the classification was based
on a "personal characteristic."
137. Id. at 894.
138. Id. at 895.
139. Id. at 897.
140. See In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 1000 (Cal. 1970).
141. See Winchell v. English, 133 Cal. Rptr 20, 22 (1976).
142. See Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217, 217 (1984); Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 164 (1982).
143. See O'Connor v. Vill. Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 428 (Cal. 1983).
144. See Long v. Valentino, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98 (1989).
145. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 129 (Cal. 1982).
146. See Ross v. Forest Lawn Mem'l Park, 203 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (1984).
147. See Frantz v. Blackwell, 265 Cal. Rptr. 178, 179 (1987).
148. See Wynn v. Monterey Club, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878, 881 (1980).
149. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 897 (Cal. 1991).
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B. Lower California 'Court Decisions in the Aftermath of Harris
Since the Harris decision in 1991, a few lower courts have inter-
preted the opinion in even more restrictive ways, seriously impacting
the protection provided by the Unruh Act. In 1992, in Beaty v. Truck
Insurance Exchange 50 the California Court of Appeal for the Third Ap-
pellate District improperly narrowed the scope of the Unruh Act's
protections by concluding that any further expansion of the statutory
protections beyond the specifically enumerated classifications was
contrary to the intention of the California legislature. 15 1 The court
interpreted Harris as requiring careful weighing when considering fur-
ther expansion of protected categories beyond those expressly enu-
merated in the Act so that expansion would be consistent with
legislative intent. 52 The court then incorrectly stated that the legisla-
ture intended to confine the Act's coverage to those categories al-
ready expressly enumerated within the statute. As a result, the court in
Beaty refused to extend the Act's protections to classifications based
on marital status. "The court reason[ed] that if the Legislature had
intended to include marital status in the list of protected categories, it
would have done so explicitly since it used a specific list in two sepa-
rate code sections of the Unruh Act."153
Beaty misreads the Harris decision-it says that Harris confined
the Unruh Act only to the types of discrimination specifically enumer-
ated therein. As discussed above, Harris did uphold the decisions
which involved a "personal characteristic" even when they involved
discrimination against persons not specifically enumerated in the Act.
If the court in Beaty followed Harris correctly, it would have tried to
determine whether marital status involved any personal characteris-
tics.154 Only if the court determined that marital status was not a per-
sonal characteristic, could it then have refused to expand the
protection of the Unruh Act.' 55 Harris does not narrow the scope of
the Unruh Act to prohibit any expansion of the statutory protections
beyond the specifically enumerated classifications, as suggested by
Beaty.156 In fact, the court in Harris upheld decisions such as Marina
150. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 597 (1992).
151. See id. at 597.
152. See id.
153. Helen Silva, Survey: Women and California Law, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1103,
1107 (1993).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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Point, Ltd. and Cox which expanded the listed categories, only if the
new categories involved personal characteristics.
In 1994, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
utilized the ambiguous "personal characteristic" distinction left by the
Harris court to further restrict the scope of the Unruh Act's protec-
tion. In Roth v. Rhodes,157 the appellate court found that a person's
occupation was not a personal characteristic, and held that occupa-
tion based discrimination was not covered by the Unruh Act.'5 8 The
plaintiff in Roth, a podiatrist, attempted to lease office space in a medi-
cal building occupied solely by medical doctors. 15 9 The owners of the
building refused to rent the space to the plaintiff based on a business
policy of only renting to occupants with medical degrees.1 60 As a podi-
atrist, the plaintiff did not hold a medical degree, but rather a degree
of doctor of podiatry.1 61 The court found the defendant owners' dis-
criminatory policy to be based on sound business reasons, indicating
that "[i]f operators of an office building perceive a niche in the mar-
ket for a particular type of tenant, no useful purpose is to be served by
[the court] interfering with their economic decision to so limit the
tenancy." 162 While the court found that this business reason justified
the application of the legitimate business exception, it based its hold-
ing instead on the finding that the Unruh Act simply did not apply. 163
Relying on Harris, the appellate court in Roth reasoned that de-
spite the broad language of earlier cases, all of the cases that ex-
panded the coverage of the Unruh Act involved discrimination based
on personal characteristics similar to the enumerated statutory classifi-
cations. 164 The court further noted that in Harris, the California Su-
preme Court limited the expansion of the statute with a line between
personal characteristics and economic discrimination.165 The court in
Roth then concluded that "[t]he election to practice a particular pro-
157. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706 (1994).
158. See id. at 710.
159. See id. at 707-08.
160. See id. at 708.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 710. The court, in its finding that the defendants had legitimate business
reasons to limit their choice of tenants to certain occupations or professions, went so far as
to suggest that the prestige attributed to the defendants' medical building, upon which the
plaintiff sought to take advantage of, may be partially the result of the discriminatory leas-
ing policy. See id. The court further suggested that it "should not insinuate itself into the
market place to prohibit [defendants] from maintaining such policies as have resulted in
the commercial success attributed to [them] by [plaintiff]." Id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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fession represents a professional, and frequently, an economic choice"
and occupational status is not the type of personal characteristic that
is protected by the Unruh Act.166 Thus, the court permitted "discrimi-
nation in leasing office space based on profession, as long as it is not a
stratagem designed to disguise discrimination based on personal char-
acteristics protected under the Unruh Civil Rights Act."' 67
The Roth decision, though arguably in line with Harris, directly
contravened past case law, where courts had interpreted the Unruh
Act's proscription as covering discrimination based on occupation. 68
Prior to Roth, in 1989, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District, in Long v. Valentino, explicitly found that occupational status
was covered by the Unruh Act.169 There, the court found the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union to be in violation of the Act when it forcibly
requested a police officer to leave a conference on police espio-
nage. 170 The court concluded that police officers "are as much enti-
tled to the protections of the Unruh Act as any other citizen," and
therefore "may not be refused service in a restaurant, denied an apart-
ment, or ejected from a public meeting merely because of their occu-
pation .... ,,171 Thus, the appellate court in Roth, in direct contra-
vention with Long, incorrectly narrowed the scope of the Unruh Act's
protections by holding that occupational status represents an eco-
nomic choice rather than a personal characteristic and therefore is
not protected under the Act.' 72
In Liebaert v. Biltmore Properties,'73 the Superior Court for Kern
County reaffirmed the ruling in Roth that occupation is not a personal
characteristic as intended by Harris and therefore is not covered by
the Unruh Act.1 74 In Liebaert, the real estate developer Biltmore re-
fused to sell the plaintiff a new home because of the plaintiff's occupa-
tion as a Bakersfield attorney. 75 The plaintiff, Timothy Liebaert, filed
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Long v. Valentino, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96, 102-03 (1989); see also 58 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. 608, 613 (1975) (indicating that the protections of the Unruh Act properly extend to
occupation).
169. See Long, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
170. See id. at 102.
171. Id. at 102-03.
172. See Roth, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707-08 (1994).
173. Liebaert v. Biltmore Props., No. 238402 SPC (Sup. Ct. Kern Cty. May 19, 1999).
174. See id.
175. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for Damages, Liebaert (No. 238402 SPC).
The facts of this case are assumed as stated in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for
Damages, Liebaert (No. 238402 SPC). See id. In February of 1999, Liebaert and his wife put
down $3,000 for a home in a new Bakersfield housing development under construction by
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suit against Biltmore, alleging unlawful arbitrary discrimination in vio-
lation of the Unruh Act. 76 In his suit, plaintiff sought actual and pu-
nitive damages as well as an injunction to prevent the developer from
"arbitrarily discriminating in refusing to deal with, sell, or lease to any
member of a class, in accordance with the Unruh Act.1 77
Biltmore claimed that its policy not to sell homes to attorneys was
based on the legitimate business reason that lawyers are prone to sue
and refusing to sell to lawyers keeps business expenses and home costs
down.1 78 Biltmore asserted that its "policy is not arbitrary based on a
dislike for either the legal profession or of those members who are
members of it . ... 79 Rather, they argued that the policy:
[S]erves a legitimate business interest . . . [because] homebuyers
who are also lawyers threaten litigation (requiring significantly
greater management time as well as legal fees and resolution costs)
at a dramatically higher rate than home buyers who are not lawyers
.... [Not selling to lawyers] enables [Biltmore] to continue to
offer its homes at more attractive prices.180
Rather than claiming that the legitimate business exception should
apply, Biltmore asserted that the decisions in both Harris and Roth
compel the court to hold that "[t] he Unruh Civil Rights Act does not
protect those that are allegedly discriminated against because they
practice a certain profession or occupation."' 8' t Biltmore further
noted that in Beaty, 182 the court interpreted the Harris holding to for-
Biltmore. See id. at 7. Biltmore's representative assured the Liebaerts that the house would
be ready to move in by August. See id. at 7-8. About a week later, the couple again met with
Biltmore's representative to pick out amenities and upgrades for their new home. See id. at
9-10. During this meeting, Liebaert mentioned that he was a lawyer. See id. at 10. Upon
hearing this, the representative responded by stating: "Oh, I am going to have to warn you
up-front, sometimes the builder refuses to sell to attorneys." See id. at 10-11. A few days
later the representative phoned Liebaert to inform him that Biltmore was canceling the
sale. See id. at 13. Then in early March, the Liebaerts received in the mail their $3,000
check with the word "void" scrawled across it. See id. at 14.
176. See id. at 19-21.
177. Id. at 23-24.
178. See Letter from Susan E. Bonanno, Attorney, Greg D. Judkins, PLC (attorneys for
Biltmore Properties), to Raymond G. Robinson, Attorney, Borton, Petrini & Conron, LLP
(attorneys for Liebaert) (March 15, 1999) ("[W]hile [Biltmore's] efforts to avoid selling
homes to lawyers reduces the field of potential buyers for its homes it is willing to accept
this reduction in order reduce the frequency of threatened and actual litigation.") (on file
with the author).
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id.
181. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Demurrer to Complaint of
Timothy B. Liebaert and Kelly Liebaert at 10 (No. 238402 SPC) (on file with the author).
182. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1992). The court held that the denial of a joint insurance
policy to an unmarried couple does not violate the Unruh Act. See id. at 1466. The court
further held that the protections of the Unruh Act do not extend to marital status. See id.
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bid any expansion of the Unruh Act's classifications beyond those spe-
cifically enumerated in the statute. 1-3
The trial court, finding that occupation is not a type of personal
characteristic covered by the Act, concluded that the Unruh Act "only
applies to race, color, creed or national origin, not profession." 8 4 The
court never reached the issue of whether the developer's anti-lawyer
policy was a legitimate business practice under the legitimate business
exception. 85 The court reasoned that it need not inquire into the
legitimacy of a discriminatory business practice unless the discrimi-
nated individual is first found to be unquestionably covered by the
Act. 186
C. Consequences of the Narrower Interpretation of the Statute
The original intent behind the enactment of the Unruh Act was
to prevent arbitrary discrimination at places of public accommodation
and service.' 8 7 Accordingly, the statute's history indicates that "the
Unruh Act prohibits business establishments from withholding their
services or goods from a broad class of individuals in order to 'cleanse'
their operations from the alleged characteristics of members of an ex-
cluded class." 188 Accordingly, prior interpretations of the Act suggest
that any exclusion of a particular person by a business can only be
justified by that individual's specific characteristics and not on the ba-
sis of class stereotypes. 189 A purveyor may not institute an exclusionary
business policy that excludes individuals simply because they fall
within a class of persons that the proprietor believes to be more likely
to engage in disruptive or damaging conduct than a member of an-
other group.' 90 A discriminatory business policy may not, under the
Unruh Act, "rest on the alleged undesirable propensities of those of a
particular race, nationality, occupation, political affiliation, or age.
183. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points & Authorities at 9, Liebaert (No. 238402
SPC).
184. Developer: No Lawyers Need Apply, Refusal to Sell House to Attorney Upheld, SAC. BEE,
May 20, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Developer].
185. See Petition for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition or other Appropriate Writ; Memo-
randum of Points & Authorities-Immediate Temporary Stay Requested at 23-25, Liebaert
(No. 238402 SPC) (on file with the author).
186. See Developer at Al.
187. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 122 (Cal. 1982); In re Cox, 474
P.2d 992, 995 (Cal. 1970).
188. Marina Point, Ltd., 640 P.2d at 117.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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The Unruh Act is designed to protect individuals from such arbitrary
discrimination." 191
The protection afforded by the Act, therefore, focuses on the in-
dividual right to equal access to services and facilities provided by pub-
lic businesses and enterprises. 192 The purpose of the Unruh Act is to
compel public accommodations covered under the statute to recog-
nize the "equality of citizens" in the right to access particular services
or facilities offered by such establishments. 93 "[T] he exclusion of in-
dividuals from places of public accommodation or other business en-
terprises covered by the Unruh Act on the basis of class or group
affiliation basically conflicts with the individual nature of the right af-
forded by the act of access to such enterprises."'1 94
The decisions in Liebaert and Roth holding that occupations are
not protected under the Unruh Act are, therefore, in direct contradic-
tion with the historical interpretations and construction of the Act.195
As the plaintiff in Liebaert argued on appeal, the practical ramifica-
tions of upholding the extremely narrow rulings would in effect insert
a "sweeping parenthetical exception" into the Unruh Act. 196 If such
an exception were allowed, the Act would provide "[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal .. . [except
lawyers, bricklayers, IRS agents, postal employees, or other persons
employed in unpopular professions, etcetera.]" to access particular
services or facilities of a business enterprise. 97 As a result, "members
of entire occupations or avocations . . .might find themselves ex-
cluded as a class from some places of public accommodation simply
because the proprietors could show that, as a statistical matter, mem-
bers of their occupation or avocation were more likely than others to
be involved in a disturbance."' 98 The consequence of this interpreta-
tion would be to completely frustrate the meaning of the statute,
which provides "all persons" be treated equally, by rendering the word
191. Id.
192. See id. at 125-26.
193. Id. at 172 (citing Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 419 (1918)).
194. Id. at 126.
195. See Roth v. Rhodes, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 710 (1994); Petition for Writ of Man-
date/Prohibition or Other Appropriate Writ; Memorandum of Points & Authorities-Im-
mediate Temporary Stay Requested at 25-26, Liebaert (No. 238402 SPC).
196. Liebaert v. Biltmore Props., No. 238402 SPC (Sup. Ct. Kern Cty. May 19, 1999).
197. Petition for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition or Other Appropriate Writ; Memoran-
dum of Points & Authorities-Immediate Temporary Stay Requested at 22, Liebaert (No.
238402 SPC).
198. Marina Point, Ltd., 640 P.2d at 126.
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"all" meaningless and ignoring the individual nature of the right pro-
tected under the Unruh Act.
Accordingly, the court in Liebaert, by holding that the Unruh Act
did not cover Biltmore's discriminatory policy, effectively sanctioned
discriminatory policies based on occupation as a valid business prac-
tice. 199 Plaintiff Liebaert explained, "the trial court's ruling stands for
the proposition, as a matter of law, that it is a legitimate business pur-
pose to blacklist or boycott a person, simply because of his or her oc-
cupation. '" 2 10 Thus real estate developers may now refuse to sell
homes to persons of any occupation. Any person could be prevented
from owning a new home, despite the particular individual's ability to
afford one.201 Furthermore, the practical implications of such a ruling
are not only confined to the area of housing.20 2 "Hospitals could re-
fuse to treat lawyers for fear of being sued. Restaurants could refuse to
serve reporters or food critics for fear of a 'bad review.' Hotels, apart-
ments, and restaurants could refuse to serve police officers fearing
that a crime may be exposed." 20 3 Ultimately, "a 'caste' system [may]
result where only persons of certain occupations would be entitled to
purchase necessaries, goods, and services."20 4
Another practical ramification of the recent trend of cases nar-
rowly interpreting the Unruh Act is the broad application of the legiti-
mate business exception to justify discriminatory policies. Both Roth
and Liebaert opened the door for a more liberal application of the
legitimate business exception. Thus, legitimate business reasons may
justify discriminatory policies against the classes of persons specifically
protected by the Act,20 5 despite priorjudicial interpretations that such
an exception may only apply to those instances involving classes of
199. See Petition for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition or other Appropriate Writ; Memo-
randum of Points & Authorities-Immediate Temporary Stay Requested at 24, Liebaert
(No. 238402 SPC) (indicating that because the trial court failed to inquire into the legiti-
mate business reasons for the defendants' discriminatory policy, the court's ruling "stands
for the proposition, as a matter of law, that it is a legitimate business purpose to blacklist or
boycott a person, simply because of his or her occupation."); Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition
at 8, Liebaert (No. 238402 SPC).
200. Petition for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition or other Appropriate Writ; Memoran-
dum of Points & Authorities-Immediate Temporary Stay Requested at 24, Liebaert (No.
238402 SPC).
201. See id. at 23; Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition at 8, Liebaert (No. 238402 SPC).
202. See Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition at 2, Liebaert (No. 238402 SPC).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Roth v. Rhodes, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 710 (1994); Plaintiffs Memorandum of
Points & Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandate at 24, Liebaert (No. 238402
SPC).
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individuals not specifically enumerated within the Act.20 6 In Roth and
Liebaert, discrimination on the basis of a person's occupation was held
to be not covered by the Act, and thus a legitimate business reason
need not justify those discriminatory polices.20 7 The implication of
these rulings is that the legitimate business exception need only be
applied to justify discrimination based on those classifications pro-
tected under the Act-those classifications expressly enumerated and
other similar classifications based on personal characteristics. If the
discriminatory practice is aimed at classes not covered by the statute's
protections the courts need not inquire into the legitimacy of the bus-
iness reason for the policy because the discriminating practice will be
regarded as legitimate as a matter of law.
These recent court decisions have incorrectly led to the narrow-
ing of the scope of protection provided by the Unruh Act. It appears
that businesses may now freely adopt discriminatory policies against
any class of person not specifically enumerated in the Act and not
classified on the basis of a personal characteristic as defined by Harris.
Under such an approach, the discriminatory policies will be upheld
and allowed by the courts as legitimate as a matter of law. Moreover,
the new, narrower interpretation of the statute may allow for the more
expansive application of the legitimate business exception. Such a re-
stricted construction of the protections provided by the statute contra-
venes the original intent of the Act to protect an individual's right to
equal access to public accommodations.
HI. The Scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act Must Be
Interpreted to Meet Its Original Intent of Preventing
All Forms of Arbitrary Discrimination
As previously discussed, prior to the Harris decision, the cases in-
terpreting the Unruh Act suggested that all forms of discrimination
were strictly proscribed. Under the earlier interpretation, "[t]he fun-
damental purpose of the Unruh Civil Rights Act [was considered to
be] the elimination of anti-social discriminatory practices,"208 whereby
the Act should be construed with "a liberal construction with a view to
206. See Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 199 (Cal. 1985); Engel v. Worthington,
23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (1993).
207. See Roth, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709; Developer, supra note 184, at A3; Plaintiff's Memo-
randum of Points & Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandate at 24, Liebaert
(No. 238402 SPC).
208. Sargoy v. Resolution Trust, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 895 (1992).
Fall 2001 ]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
effectuating its purposes."20 9 Thus, prior case law has extended the
Act's coverage to classifications beyond those specifically enumerated
in the statute. 210 Moreover, no court has permitted business reasons
to justify discrimination against the explicitly protected classes. The
only context in which courts have upheld discriminatory policies on
the basis of the legitimate business exception is when they have ap-
plied the Act to persons not expressly protected by the Act. 21 1
Recent court decisions, however, have misread the Unruh Act,
resulting in a dramatic step backward in the prevention of all forms of
arbitrary discrimination. Under the current construction of the Act,
businesses may freely exclude and discriminate against broad catego-
ries of persons based on generalized stereotypes regarding their
shared economic or financial characteristics. These are precisely the
types of discriminatory practices the Unruh Act was intended to pre-
vent. In enacting the statute, the California legislature had aimed at
prohibiting such discriminatory business policies which rest on sup-
posed undesirable propensities of a particular class or group of per-
sons.2 12 Considering the nearly unlimited range of new categories of
persons that businesses may now freely discriminate against, the ur-
gent need to return to the original broad judicial interpretation of the
protections of the Unruh Act now becomes abundantly clear.
In order for the original intent of the Unruh Act to be pre-
served, 21 3 courts should not follow the approach of the lower courts
discussed above because they are not bound by them. Instead, these
209. Koire, 707 P.2d at 196 (1985).
210. See Long v. Valentino, 165 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1989).
211. See, e.g., In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970).
212. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 117 (Cal. 1982).
213. Of course, one possible way to protect the original intent of the Unruh Act would
be for the Legislature to amend the statute to make it clear that the intent was to protect
all persons from arbitrary discrimination without limiting that protection to a short list.
This could be accomplished by simply inserting a phrase such as "all persons are protected
against arbitrary discrimination," followed by a second phrase stating that "the listed cate-
gories are illustrative and not exclusive," without contradicting existing case law.
This proposed amendment is consistent with earlier court decisions. Since 1897, when
the Civil Rights Act was enacted, courts interpreted the Act to protect against all arbitrary
discrimination. In Orloff the court noted, "under our institutions the freedom to pursue
the declared right [to public accommodations] on an equal basis is just as precious as
many other freedoms and rights." Orloffv. Los Angeles Turf Club, 227 P.2d 449, 453 (Cal.
1951). The court in that case held that a race track manager was barred from discriminat-
ing against a man who had a reputation of having an immoral character. See id. at 454. The
court also protected the right of homosexuals to obtain food and drink in a bar and restau-
rant. In Stoumen both of these decisions protect against arbitrary discrimination against
groups not specifically listed in the Unruh Act and therefore, are not overturned by the
proposed amendment. See Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
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courts should follow the California Supreme Court's rulings in both
Cox and Harris.
A. The Lower Court Decisions Interpreting the Scope of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act Protections Should Not Be
Considered Precedential Authority
Despite recent court interpretations that the protections pro-
vided by the Unruh Civil Rights Act are to be applied narrowly, Cali-
fornia appellate courts still have the opportunity and the authority to
reverse the current trend. By reconsidering the issue of whether the
Act's protections are to be afforded only to those classes explicitly
enumerated or to those persons classified based on personal charac-
teristics as defined by Harris, the trend can be reversed. In Harris, the
California Supreme Court did not expressly overrule prior case law in
which the protections of the Unruh Act were extended beyond the
enumerated categories, nor did the court expressly hold that persons
classified by their occupation are not covered by the Act.214 The court
did find that the statute covers only those classes specifically enumer-
ated in the Act as well as persons classified on the basis of certain
personal characteristics as opposed to economic characteristics. 21
5
Such personal characteristics were said to include "a person's geo-
The proposed language is also consistent with the 1959 amendment, as well as deci-
sions following that amendment. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873,
875-78 (Cal. 1991). The 1959 amendment specifies "color, race, religion, ancestry, and
national origin." In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 995 (Cal. 1970). In In re Cox, the court inter-
preted this new amendment to be the result of the concern for the "plight of racial minori-
ties within the United States." Id. at 998. The court went on to say that no evidence existed
to show that the intent was to restrict the Act to only the categories listed, but instead to
make sure these categories would be included. See id. at 998-99. Later in 1991, the court in
Harris, interpreted the 1959 amendment to illustrate a "personal characteristic" standard
used to decide whether to apply the Act or not. See Harims, 805 P.2d at 883. The court found
that the categories could be expanded only when a "personal characteristic" is to be pro-
tected. See id. at 882. Therefore, the proposed language would continue to include the
categories that the 1959 Legislature wanted to include as well as the categories of "personal
characteristics" that the Harris court wanted to protect.
Thus, a new amendment to the Act can be enacted without contradicting any of the
existing decisions applying the Act. The intent of the Legislature-to insure that every
citizen be protected-must be upheld by the courts. As the Chairman of the Select Com-
mittee on Housing and Urban Affairs explained when sending to the Governor the 1974
amendment to add "sex" to the Act, "[t] he listing of possible bases of discrimination has no
legal effect, but is merely illustrative." Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 122
(1982). This intent, expressed by the Chairman, must be made clear in the language of the
Act for the legal profession and the courts to follow. The proposed language would do
exactly that.
214. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 879, 881-83 (Cal. 1991).
215. See id. at 883-84.
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graphic origin, physical attributes, and personal beliefs." 21 6 Although
the court's holding limited the scope of the statute's protections, it
did not expressly overrule precedent that applied the Act to
nonenumerated classes.
On the other hand, the courts in Roth, Liebaert, and Beaty improp-
erly expanded upon the narrower interpretation of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act used in Harris. The courts in both Roth and Liebaert held
that discrimination on the basis of an individual's occupation does not
violate the statute. 217 Furthermore, relying on Harris, the court in
Beaty concluded that any expansion of the Act beyond the classifica-
tions specifically mentioned in the statute was contrary to legislative
intent.2 8 The Liebaert decision, however, was issued at the trial level
and both Roth and Beaty were at the intermediate appellate level.
Thus, Liebaert, Roth, and Beaty would lack controlling authority at the
appellate level.
Under the principles of stare decisis, no California appellate court
is bound to follow appellate division decisions.219 "One district or divi-
sion may [thus] refuse to follow a prior decision of a different district
or division. ' 220 The courts of appeal or the supreme court may look to
prior appellate decision for guidance in interpreting the scope of the
Unruh Act, but they are not compelled to follow any of those deci-
sions.221 Opinions that are ordered published by appellate judges
have no controlling or binding effect on either the appellate courts or
higher reviewing courts.222 An appellate court's review of a trial
court's decision and the appellate court's holdings are deemed bind-
ing on the trial courts.223 Trial court decisions have no binding effect
under stare decisis.224 Hence, only the decision of the state supreme
court "is considered absolutely binding on a trial court or lower appel-
late court" in the state of California.225
216. Id. at 883.
217. See Petition for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition or other Appropriate Writ; Memo-
randum of Points & Authorities-Immediate Temporary Stay Requested at 24, Liebaert
(No. 238402 SPC); Roth, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710; Developer, supra note 184, at A3.
218. See Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 597 (1992).
219. See 9 B.E. WITrKIN, WITKIN CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 934 (4th ed. 1997).
220. Id.
221. See id. § 935.
222. See id.
223. See id. § 933.
224. See id. § 992.
225. Id. § 928 ("[A] Supreme Court decision must be followed by trial judges, Courts of
Appeal and appellate departments of the superior court.").
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Accordingly, since there is no California Supreme Court opinion
directly addressing the issue of whether occupation is or is not pro-
tected under the Act, the California appellate courts are not con-
strained by the decisions of Roth, Beaty, and Liebaert. The appellate
courts can also consider whether the Unruh Act should be interpreted
to be strictly limited to the categories of persons specifically enumer-
ated. Considering the original intent of the statute, the historically
broad interpretation of the Act's protections, and the public policy
reasons for proscribing all forms of arbitrary discrimination, it be-
comes clear that future courts should reverse the current trend of re-
stricting the scope of the Unruh Act and find that the Unruh Act is
not limited "to race, color, creed, or national origin" as held by the
Liebaert court.226
B. A Proper Interpretation of Harris
Early interpretations of the Unruh Act broadly construed its cov-
erage to prohibit all forms of arbitrary discrimination regardless of
whether the discriminated person fell within specifically enumerated
classifications. In 1991, the court in Harris limited the protections of
the Unruh Act to those statutorily enumerated categories and similar
classifications based on "personal characteristics. '" 227 The court rea-
soned that economic characteristics were not on the same level with
the "personal characteristics" of classes specifically protected by the
statute or in prior court holdings. Therefore, classifications based on
financial status or capability were not covered by the Act.2 28 The court
in Harris further reasoned that economic criteria "by their nature seek
to further the legitimate interest of business establishments in control-
ling financial risk while providing goods and services on a non-dis-
criminatory basis." 229 Accordingly, the court found that a policy
establishing a minimum income criteria to be eligible to rent an apart-
ment was not arbitrary discrimination under the Unruh Act.230
The court in Harris intended to limit the application of the Un-
ruh Act. In its ruling, the court clearly expressed disapproval of previ-
ous broad interpretations of the Act's protections.231 The decision did
not nullify previous decisions protecting classifications not specifically
226. Developer, supra note 184, at Al.
227. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 881-83 (Cal. 1991).
228. See id.
229. Id. at 874.
230. See id. at 882.
231. See id.
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enumerated. 23 2 The court "expressly declined to overrule prior case
law" leaving "intact a court's authority to recognize previously pro-
tected unexpressed classifications. '2 33 Furthermore, not only did Har-
ris refuse to overrule Cox and its progeny, but the court recognized
that the legislature tacitly approved of prior decisions by not legislat-
ing to the contrary. 234 Therefore, any expansion of who is covered
under the Act prior to Harris remains protected.
We generally presume the Legislature is aware of appellate court
decisions. It has not taken specific action to overrule these cases.
Moreover, the Legislature has amended the Act several times in the
20-year period since Cox was decided. When the Legislature
amends a statute without altering portions of the provision that
have previously been judicially construed, the Legislature is pre-
sumed to have been aware of and to have acquiesced in the previ-
ous judicial construction. Accordingly, reenacted portions of the
statute are given the same construction they received before the
amendment.
Thus, [any] suggestion that the holdings of Cox, Marina Point,
Ltd., O'Connor, and similar appellate court decisions [that extend]
the Unruh Act beyond its specified categories of discrimination
have somehow been repudiated by the Legislature is [unsound];
the absence of any specific legislative action designed to alter those
holdings belies any such inference. 235
Hence, the limitation on the scope of the Unruh Act's protec-
tions should be interpreted to apply only to persons who were not
previously considered protected by the Act. The court in Harris clearly
did not intend to overrule past expansions of the statute's protections.
Instead, the court's decision merely implies that any future expansion
of the Act should be considered carefully and conservatively. 23 6
Support for such an application of Harris is found in several sub-
sequent decisions. Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange,2 3 7 involved the is-
sue of whether an insurer should be compelled to provide insurance
for a homosexual couple. 238 While the court, citing Harris, refused to
extend protection to an unmarried couple, it emphasized that Harris
is to be applied prospectively, and careful consideration of legislative
intent must be undertaken when considering each future expansion
of the Act.239 "While the Harris court refused to overrule prior case
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 879.
235. Id. at 879-80.
236. See Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 597 (1992).
237. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1992).
238. See id. at 593.
239. See id. at 597.
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law which extended the Unruh Act to classifications not expressed in
the statute .... the court made it clear that the future expansion of
prohibited categories should be carefully weighed to ensure a result
consistent with legislative intent."240
In King v. Hofer,24 1 non-smokers were denied protection under
the Unruh Act.242 Respondent business owner had informed peti-
tioner that he would no longer be welcomed or served at the restau-
rant after petitioner had complained to the city manager that the
respondent allowed smoking in his restaurant. 243 The court affirmed
the order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent, ruling
that, based on the statutory language and history of the Act, legitimate
business interests, and adverse consequences of inclusion, non-smok-
ers were not a protected class. 244 Similar to Beaty, the King court de-
nied expansion of the Act's protections to a new classification. 245 On
the other hand, despite the court's unwillingness to recognize new
classifications, it construed Harris to allow for the coverage of unex-
pressed categories:
The Act applies by its terms to discrimination in public accommo-
dations based on "sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national ori-
gin, or disability .... " Nevertheless, courts have deemed those
categories "illustrative rather than restrictive" . . . and have con-
strued the Act to apply to several unexpressed classifications-
namely, unconventional dress or physical appearance, families with
children, persons under age 18, and homosexuality .... In Harris,
the Supreme Court questioned whether it would so expand the Act
were it "writing on a clean slate" . . . ; nevertheless, given legislative
acquiescence in those case holdings-if not in broader language
condemning all arbitrary, unreasonable or stereotyped discrimina-
tion ... the Supreme Court chose to honor those holdings while
reigning in the broader language and setting guidelines for future
construction.246
The reference to a limitation on future expansion suggests that while
pre-Harris expansions should remain protected, any future expansion
of the Act's coverage should be considered carefully.
To determine whether the protections provided by the Unruh
Act should be afforded to new non-enumerated classifications, the
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (1996).
242. See King, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722 ("concluding that the Act does not afford protec-
tion to business patrons allegedly discriminated against for their status as nonsmokers").
243. See id. at 719.
244. See id. at 721-22.
245. See id.
246. Id. at 720.
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court in King derived a "three-part test."247 The test requires the exam-
ination of "(1) the language and history of the Act; (2) any legitimate
business interests justifying limitations on consumer access; and (3)
the consequences of expanding class recognition. '" 24 According to
the court, these three factors should be considered when determining
if expansion of the Unruh Act's protections to new classifications is
warranted. 249
As previously discussed, the decision in Harris has been inter-
preted to imply that the legitimate business exception could be ap-
plied to justify discrimination against the expressly protected classes
and similar classes based on personal characteristics. Relying on Har-
ris, the court in Roth noted that the application of the exception need
only be considered when the discriminatory policy or conduct in-
volves a class of persons covered under the Act.250 Subsequently, the
court in Liebaert suggested that since classifications based on economic
characteristics are not protected, the issue of whether the discrimina-
tory practices based on financial criteria are justified by legitimate bus-
iness reasons need not be reached.251 Thus, it may be inferred that
the exception need only be considered when the discrimination in-
volves classifications specifically enumerated in the statute and those
based on personal characteristics. Consequently, the court in Liebaert,
finding that occupation was not a personal characteristic intended to
be protected under the Act, did not need to inquire whether the pol-
icy discriminating on the basis of occupation was justified by any legiti-
mate business reasons.
To reconcile the Harris decision with the earlier interpretations
of the Act, the "personal characteristic" distinction of the Harris court
can be interpreted as drawing a line between two levels of protection
under the Unruh Act, rather than as drawing a line between those
that are covered by the Act from those that are not. Under this inter-
pretation of the Harris decision, the classes of persons specifically enu-
merated and similar classes based on "personal characteristics" are
afforded the highest level of protection under the Act. At this level,
discriminatory conduct may only be justified by a specific characteris-
tic or conduct of a particular individual and not by the presumed con-
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 720.
250. See Roth v. Rhodes, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 710 (1994).
251. See Petition for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition or other Appropriate Writ; Memo-
randum of Points & Authorities-Immediate Temporary Stay Requested at 23-24, Liebaert
(No. 238402 SPC).
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duct or characteristic of the class as a whole. A lower level of
protection is provided to other classifications, such as economic char-
acteristics. At this lower level, discrimination may be justified by legiti-
mate business reasons. Thus, this broader interpretation of Harris
views the "personal characteristic" distinction as distinguishing those
classes where the legitimate business exception may not be applied
from those classes in which it may be applied.
This two-tiered level of protection under the Unruh Act recon-
ciles the Harris decision with the prior case history of the Act. Thus, in
Cox, although the discriminatory act at issue was directed toward the
companion of a long haired and unconventionally dressed man, the
court held that the offending establishment could not justifiably dis-
criminate on the basis of characteristics associated with such an indi-
vidual, even though unconventional appearance is not expressly
protected under the statute. 252 Similarly, in Marina Point, Ltd., the
court held that a rental policy excluding all families with children
from rental housing constituted the kind of arbitrary discrimination
prohibited by the Unruh Act.25 3 "[T] he fact that the landlord's exclu-
sionary policy in this case discriminated against children and families
with children, rather than a specific racial or religious group or some
other classification specifically involved in a prior judicial decision,
does not place the exclusionary practice beyond the reach of the Un-
ruh Act. ''254 However, in both Cox and Marina Point, Ltd., the courts
recognized that a legitimate business exception may justify certain
kinds of discrimination. 255 Nevertheless, decisions prior to Harris had
not accepted any legitimate business reasons to justify discriminatory
policies directed toward the expressly protected classifications enu-
merated in the Act.256 Thus, in Koire, a gender discrimination case,
the court found that discriminatory policies do not qualify as reasona-
ble simply because they are profitable or otherwise in the interest of
business. The court refused to apply the legitimate business exception
to the offering of discounts and free admissions on the basis of gen-
der, an expressly protected classification. 257
The language of Harris itself supports the new proposed rule of
interpretation. In Harris, the court focused on the enumerated statu-
252. See In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 1000 (1970).
253. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 116 (Cal. 1982).
254. Id. at 117.
255. See Cox, 474 P.2d at 995; Marina Point, Ltd., 640 P.2d at 124-27.
256. See, e.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985).
257. See id. at 199.
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tory classifications and noted that "[i]n order to give significance to
the Legislature's specific and repeated emphasis on these categories,
we must ascertain their common element. The categories involve per-
sonal as opposed to economic characteristics." 258 By finding that prior
expansions of the Act all involved classifications based on "personal
characteristics," it follows that the court intended that such classifica-
tions be protected to the same extent as those expressly enumerated
in the statute. The court declined to overrule the case precedent, rec-
ognizing the validity of prior decisions expanding statutory protec-
tions to classes of persons not specifically protected under the Act. 259
Accordingly, any discriminatory practice aimed at someone based on
a personal characteristic, whether enumerated in the Act or not, is
strictly prohibited and may not be justified by any business reason.
Considering the Harris court's emphasis on business justifications
for certain discriminatory practices, it can be inferred that the court
understood that classifications based on non-personal characteristics
would violate the Unruh Act unlessjustified by legitimate business rea-
sons. Read in this context, the message of Harris becomes clear.
Therefore discriminatory practices which affect those categories spe-
cifically protected by the Act, or those which are based on personal
characteristics, are disallowed. Practices aimed at a group not so pro-
tected are not violative of the Act, provided there is a legitimate busi-
ness reason for such practices.
C. A Proper Definition of "Personal Characteristics" As Set Forth
in Harris
Personal characteristics are those qualities that help shape and
define a person's societal qualifications. Defining a personal charac-
teristic is a complicated task. Sociological studies have shown that peo-
ple incorporate their own definitions of personal identity when
describing themselves. Research has shown that traits and qualifica-
tions other than race, sex, and religion can be classified as personal
characteristics as well. For example, someone's ethnic background
can be considered a personal characteristic and a person's economic
status is included as well. 260 A person's ethnicity is shaped by their
social and economic status.261 A personal characteristic is shown to
258. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 883 (Cal. 1991).
259. See id. at 882-83.
260. See Joane Nagel, Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and
Culture, 41 Soc. PROBS. 152 (1994).
261. See id. at 154.
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carry with it social variables that individuals use in creating their own
self-identity, namely education, occupation, and religion.262 These fac-
tors should be considered when defining what a personal characteris-
tic is. The definition of "personal characteristic" should be inclusive of
certain and ever changing social variables.
Many factors make up our self-definition and can be considered
personal characteristics. For example, officers of the law, when asked
to describe a suspect's characteristics, state the suspect's hair and eye
color, height, weight, ethnicity, gender, and if any, bodily scars, and/
or tattoos. Likewise, from a social standpoint, these are some of the
same characteristics one uses to describe oneself. Some of these char-
acteristics are not enumerated in the Act, but are nevertheless neces-
sary when describing an individual. Thus, it is important for the courts
to focus on the fully inclusive definition of "personal characteristic"
when determining whether a person is a member of a protected class
under the Unruh Act.
D. Maintaining Limits on the Legitimate Business Exception to
Protect the Intent of the Unruh Civil Rights Act
Historically, courts have indicated a need to place limits on the
application of the legitimate business exception in order to protect
the intent of the Unruh Act, which is to prevent arbitrary discrimina-
tion. Courts have held that discriminatory business practices based on
a class-based generalization do not qualify as reasonable or justifiable
merely because they are profitable. 263 To hold otherwise would evis-
cerate the protections of the Act.2 64 An examination of prior court
decisions addressing the legitimate business exception reveal several
restrictions and limits that should be imposed on its use.
1. The Discriminatory Business Policy Must Be Reasonable and
Rationally Related to a Legitimate Business Interest
One limitation of the legitimate business exception is that the
business policy at issue must be "reasonable . . . [and] rationally re-
lated to the services performed and the facilities provided."265 The
court in Harris provided further guidance by requiring that such busi-
ness policies bear "a reasonable relation to commercial objectives ap-
262. See Vira R. Kivett et al., The Relative Importance of Physical, Psychological, and Social
Variables to Locus of Control Orientation in Middle Age, 32 J. GERONTOLOGY 203, 204 (1977).
263. See Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 199 (Cal. 1985).
264. See id.
265. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 877 (Cal. 1991).
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propriate to an enterprise serving the public. ''266 According to
relevant Attorney General opinions, discrimination against a particu-
lar class by an establishment is unwarranted when such a classification
does not serve to further a legitimate business reason or does not dis-
rupt a particular atmosphere that the establishment is striving to
maintain.2 67
Other situations, such as the denial of housing accommodations
because of one's occupation, marital status, or number of children,
may or may not be violative of the Unruh Act depending on whether
those regulations denying such accommodations are reasonable and
rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided.
For example, an apartment complex could justifiably establish itself to
serve elderly people, have special facilities for them, and design the
complex for maximum quiet and restfulness. 268 Under these circum-
stances, the denial of an apartment complex to people with children
would not be "arbitrary" and would not violate the Act. On the other
hand, it is doubtful that such an apartment complex could justify de-
nying an apartment to a person because of his or her occupation or
marital status because such a status may upset the atmosphere the
complex is trying to maintain. Of course, individual tenants who dis-
rupt the atmosphere, not because of their occupation or marital sta-
tus, but because of their own personalities or predilections could be
denied the accommodations.2 69
Therefore, the discrimination must serve to protect a particular
atmosphere that an establishment is attempting to maintain in order
to be justified. For instance, numerous cases have upheld employer
policies requiring men to have short hair while not imposing the same
requirement on women.2 70 In such situations, courts have been reluc-
tant to hold employers liable for imposing different appearance
guidelines on men and women as long as the policies are found to be
rationally related to business interests. Thus, establishments may
adopt dress standards, such as no earrings for males, if the restrictions
serve a legitimate business purpose such as benefiting health, safety,
productivity, a desire to convey a certain image to the public, or to
266. Id. at 886.
267. See 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 608, 613 (1975).
268. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 127-28 (Cal. 1982).
269. See id. at 117.
270. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 482 F.2d 535 (1973); Doyle v. Buffalo
Sidewalk Cafe, 333 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1972); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402
(1972); Shardron v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., No. 574-45., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 850 (1975).
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create a professional atmosphere. In many instances, the rational rela-
tionship of the discriminatory practice to the business performed is
easily identified. For instance, a chic restaurant's policy of requiring
its patrons to wear shirts and shoes can be shown to be reasonably
related to the establishment's goal of providing fine dining to upscale
patrons. Likewise, in certain establishments, clothing bearing any
gang resemblance, such as bandannas, is prohibited and patrons wear-
ing such clothing may be asked to leave or will be refused service.
Establishments such as Magic Mountain, a southern California amuse-
ment park, practice this form of discrimination as a legitimate busi-
ness exception where these practices are reasonably related to their
goals of providing an enjoyable and safe environment. 271
In Hessians Motorcycle Club v. JC. Flanagans,272 members of two
motorcycle clubs were refused service by a sports bar because their
outfits consisted of a patch signifying allegiance to a particular club.273
In ruling for the sports bar, the California court of appeal found there
was no discrimination because the sports bar's "no colors" rule was
equally applicable to all persons, regardless of their race, color, sex,
etc. 2 74 Moreover, the court found that the rationale behind the policy
was due in part to security considerations. Because of the magnitude
of the loss that could result from a brawl, the bar's policy was not
irrational. 275 In other words, the challenged admission policy served a
legitimate business interest. Discriminatory policies may be necessary
in certain situations where a business purpose is either being frus-
trated or impeded. For example, a business may refuse service to a
patron carrying a weapon, just as it may refuse service to a patron who
is underage or exhibiting perverse behavior. In these instances, dis-
criminatory policies can be easily identified as rationally related to the
business's interests and goals.
In other instances, however, the relationship of a business policy
to the services provided may be more difficult to discern. In such
cases, the business may be required to call on expert opinion and sta-
tistical data to justify the challenged policy. The court in Marina Point,
Ltd., in examining whether an adult-only business policy was rationally
related to the operation of an apartment complex, noted that the bus-
271. See Metro Digest, Magic Mountain Settles Bias Suit, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1989, at
Metro 10. See also Steve Hudis, Letters to the Editor, Martinez Distortions on Magic Mountain,
L.A. TIMES, April 22, 1988, at A10.
272. 86 Cal. App. 4th 833 (2001).
273. See id. at 835.
274. See id. at 838.
275. See id.
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iness's "witnesses presented no statistical data in support of their con-
clusion, but simply testified on the basis of their general
experience." 276 The court further indicated that the legitimate busi-
ness exception may not be invoked simply on the basis of the estab-
lishment owner's or operator's general experience that a particular
class of consumers is more problematic or difficult. Otherwise, "[indi-
viduals] might find themselves excluded as a class from some places of
public accommodation simply because the proprietors could show
that, as a statistical matter, members of their [class] were more likely
than others to be involved in a disturbance. '" 277 Thus, where the ra-
tional relationship is not clear, Marina Point, Ltd. implies that the en-
terprise must statistically prove that its discriminatory policy does not
merely exclude those classes of persons that may be considered dis-
ruptive or problematic, but actually furthers a legitimate business
interest.
2. The Discriminatory Business Practice Should Be the Least
Discriminatory Means to Further the Legitimate
Business Interest
Even if the discriminatory practice is found to be rationally re-
lated to the furtherance of a legitimate business interest, the discrimi-
natory policy should nonetheless be the least discriminatory means
available to achieve that business purpose. Thus, in Marina Point, Ltd.,
when the court held that an adult-only apartment rental policy vio-
lated the Unruh Act, it took notice that the apartment manager "did
not indicate ... what steps, short of the blanket exclusionary policy,
the landlord had implemented to deal with the problem, such as
promulgating general rules as to permissible and impermissible con-
duct or excluding from the complex those families whose children
repeatedly committed disruptive or destructive acts." 278 On the con-
trary, the court in Harris considered several alternatives the landlord
could have utilized to achieve the business interest of minimizing the
costs of a renter defaulting on rent payments, other than the existing
practice of requiring a minimum level of income.279 The court ex-
plored the landlord's option to charge higher rent to all tenants to
offset the costs of failed rent payments, but found that such a policy
would discriminate against "the majority of tenants who pay their
276. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 119 (Cal. 1982).
277. Id. at 126.
278. Id. at 118.
279. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 885 (Cal. 1991).
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rents on a regular basis" and "excludes even more low income persons
from tenancy."280 The court also examined the possibility of requiring
higher initial deposits, but concluded that this practice would also be
discriminatory as it "imposes additional burdens on the paying te-
nants."281 Therefore, both Harris and Marina Point, Ltd. illustrate that
if a discriminatory practice is rationally related to a legitimate business
purpose, it must still be the least discriminatory means available to
achieve that purpose.
3. The Discriminatory Business Policy Must Not Classify Persons
on the Basis of the Statutorily Protected Categories
Another limit that has been developed by courts considering the
legitimate business exception is that the policy must be facially and
effectively neutral with regard to the strictly protected statutory classi-
fications. As emphasized in the Harris decision, a business practice
must "not make distinctions among persons based on the classifica-
tions listed in the Act (e.g., race, sex, religion, etc.) or similar personal
traits, beliefs, or characteristics that bear no relationship to the re-
sponsibilities of consumers of public accommodations."28 2 Legitimate
business policies must "appl [y] uniformly and neutrally to all persons
regardless of personal characteristics. '" 283 Moreover, as the court in
Roth concluded, such policies must not be "a stratagem designed to
disguise discrimination based on personal characteristics protected
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act."28 4
4. The Discriminatory Business Practice Must Not Contravene
Public Policy
Furthermore, even if a discriminatory business practice can be
justified by legitimate business reasons, the courts still may invalidate
it if it contravenes public policy. Thus, the court in Marina Point, Ltd.
found that the business interest of excluding children from housing
was against the compelling societal interest of providing "moderate
and low income households with children [with] ... decent, safe, and
suitable housing.., they can afford."28 5 Furthermore, because there
existed a paramount social and legitimate state interest in assuring
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 889.
283. Id.
284. Roth v. Rhodes, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 710 (1994).
285. Marina Point, Ltd v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 128-29 (1982) (citing 1979 Cal. Stat.,
ch. 1043, §§ 1-2, pp. 3643-44).
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available housing for families with children, a rental policy refusing
rental housing to families with children was in violation of the Unruh
Act.28 6
Similarly, rental policies refusing rental housing to a prospective
tenant solely for the reason that she is or was a defendant in an unlaw-
ful detainer action are considered "unlawful because [they are] in der-
ogation of the public policy encouraging tenants to use courts to
resolve disputes with their landlords. '" 2s 7 The business justification for
such a policy that results in the blacklisting of a certain group of te-
nants from renting housing is based on the assumption that defend-
ants in unlawful detainer actions present poor credit risks.2 88 This
assumption, however, is founded upon a generalization that may not
apply to many members within that class.289 Furthermore, such an as-
sumption creates the adverse effect of discouraging tenants to utilize
the judicial system to resolve disputes with landlords. 290 Consequently,
"[r] efusing to rent to a prospective tenant on that basis is ... arbitrary
discrimination, and unlawful under the Unruh Civil Rights Act."29 '
5. The Impact of the Business Decision Should Be Considered
Neutral rules of conduct, such as requiring patrons to wear shoes
and shirts, are acceptable because these types of rules usually have no
undue impact on any specific person or groups of people. In addition,
such neutral rules are easy to enforce and comply with. In some cases,
however, the rule may have consequences that would have great im-
pact on an individual's personal freedom. Rules that cover only the
appearance of a person, such as a rule prohibiting the wearing of
gang clothing might be appropriate, but a prohibition against gang
members would not. A person might easily change their clothing, but
requiring someone to change their association goes too far. A rule
prohibiting the wearing of hats in a restaurant would have a minimal
impact on persons who wished to wear such articles. However, if some-
one needed to keep their head covered by a yarmulke for religious
reasons, the rule would have a much more serious impact on the per-
sonal freedom of that customer. All of these considerations require a
286. See id. at 129.
287. Gary Williams, Can Government Limit Tenant Blacklisting?, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 1077,
1114 (1995) (noting that such business practices are contrary to public policy and there-
fore are considered unlawful in California and at least two other states).
288. See id. at 1114-15 n.285.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 1114.
291. Id. at 1114-15 n.285.
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careful scrutiny of legitimate business exceptions. These exceptions
must be reasonable and specifically related to the business interests
they allegedly protect.
Conclusion
California's history of protecting people from all arbitrary forms
of discrimination should be furthered. The intent of the California
legislature in promulgating the Unruh Act was to ensure freedom
from discrimination for all persons. This goal can be accomplished
with careful interpretation of the Act and California Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Resolution of the problems posed by California's ap-
proach is important. The value this unique approach protects-the
right of self-definition-is universal, although not universally pro-
tected. If the Unruh Act can be made to work, it may well become a
model for future anti-discrimination legislation. If, on the other hand,
recent developments signal the Act's ultimate fate, an important ex-
periment will have failed. The people of California, and indeed, peo-
ple in other states, deserve protection from arbitrary discrimination.
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